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Pakistan’s Industrial Experience and 
Future Directions 
A. R. KEMAL 
This paper examines the growth and patterns of industrial production and investment 
activities in Pakistan during the last fifty years, 1947–1997. The industrial strategies pursued 
so far and the levels of efficiency and protection in the manufacturing industries are also 
examined. It shows that the growth rate of the manufacturing sector exceeded 8 percent up to 
the 1980s, but in the recent years, it has slipped to around 3 percent. Keeping in view the 
current sluggish output growth and inadequate investments in the industrial sector, it is 
recommended that Pakistan must pursue the efficient industrialisation strategy. For this 
purpose, the country has to pursue the sole objective of accelerating the pace of industrial 
investment activities and the tariff structure has to be changed in such a way that the activities 
chosen accord with her dynamic comparative advantage. In addition, the government will need 
to influence the structure of incentives, which are largely governed in Pakistan by the 
protection structure. The government must provide the necessary physical and social   
infrastructure for efficient industrialisation. Augmenting the science and technology apparatus 
of the private sector, bringing research institutions up to the international standards, and 
streamlining of technology creation, absorption and diffusion systems are essential  to diversify 
production towards new technology-based industries. Cluster approach (i.e., an agglomeration 
of key industries, supporting sectors, infrastructures, and institutions that are interlinked and 
interdependent) can be quite useful in the development of vendors. The regulatory framework 
needs to be streamlined. There is also a need to improve outdated and overlapping laws 
regarding the industrial sector. Human resource development (through cluster approach) would 
improve industrial efficiency through innovations. Consistent and stable policies and improved 
law and order situation are pre-requisites for efficient industrial development in Pakistan. 
INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan’s manufacturing sector is at the crossroads. The import substitution 
industrial strategy which she has all along pursued did result in the growth rate of the 
manufacturing exceeding 8 percent upto the Eighties, but in recent years, not only the 
growth rate has slipped to around 3 percent, major structural problems have also 
emerged in the industrial sector. Lack of diversification in the industrial output, limited 
exposure to competition, a distorted incentive structure, allocative, technical and x-
inefficiencies, negligible growth in productivity, absence of R&D, lack of quality and 
standardised products, constrained employment growth, etc., have forced Pakistan to 
A. R. Kemal is Chief Economist, Ministry of Planning and Development, Planning and 
Development Division, Islamabad. 
Author’s Note: An earlier version of the paper was read at a conference organised by Applied 
Economics Research Centre, Karachi in December, 1997. A. R. Kemal  930 
look for alternative strategies. The export-oriented industrialisation strategy, 
employment-oriented strategy, and technology-based industrial growth are being 
contemplated as the alternative strategies.  
Sluggish growth of output and inadequate investments in the manufacturing 
output in recent years are the symptoms of deep-rooted problems from which the sector 
is suffering. The present study analyses the growth and the pattern of output and 
investment, as well as efficiencies, in the perspective of industrial strategies with a view 
to suggesting future industrialisation strategies.   
The plan of the paper is as follows. After this introductory section, the growth 
and pattern of industrial production and investment are examined in Section II. The 
industrial strategies pursued so far are examined in Section III. Levels of efficiency and 
the protection to manufacturing industries of Pakistan have been analysed in Section IV. 
Prospects of industrial growth are examined in Section V. 
 
II. GROWTH OF OUTPUT AND INVESTMENT IN THE 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF PAKISTAN 
 
Growth and Pattern of Output 
At the time of independence there were only a handful of large scale 
manufacturing units in the country. Growing at a rate of 9.1 percent over the 1949-50 to 
1996-97 period, the share of large scale manufacturing sector in GDP has risen from 2.2 
to 11.7 percent.
1 The small scale industries over this period have grown at a rate of 5.4 
percent
2 while the manufacturing sector as a whole grew by 7.2 percent. The share of 
manufacturing sector, both small and large scale, in GDP has increased from 7.8 percent 
in 1949-50 to 17.9 percent in 1996-97 (See Tables 1 and 2).  
 
Table 1 








1950–60 2.3  15.4  7.7 
1960–70 2.9  13.3  9.9 
1970–80 7.9  3.9  4.8 
1980–90 8.4  8.1  8.2 
1990–97 8.4  3.5  5.0 
1950–95 5.4  9.1  7.2 
Source:  Government of Pakistan  (Various Issues). 
1The share of large-scale manufacturing sector had increased to 12.7 percent in 1989-90, but because 
industrial growth rate has fallen since then, its share has declined.  
2No survey results have been available after 1983-84 for small-scale industries and, as such, growth 
since then is assumed at 8.4 percent, on the assumption that the growth rate observed in 1976-77 to 1983-84 






Percentage Share of Manufacturing in GDP 








1949-50  5.5 2.2 7.8 
1959-60 5.1  6.9  12.0 
1969-70 3.5  12.5  16.0 
1979-80 4.6  12.4  17.0 
1989-90 4.9  12.7  17.6 
1996-97 6.2  11.7  17.9 
Source: Government of Pakistan  (Various Issues).  
 
The growth rates of manufacturing sector have been quite uneven over different 
time periods. The large-scale manufacturing output grew at a rate of 15.4 percent during 
the 1950s, though it was largely affected by the low base. It continued its momentum in 
the 1960s when it grew at a rather high rate of 13.3 percent. Due to a number of factors 
including the structural problems, such as inefficiency and lack of diversification, the 
dislocation of industries as a result of loss of the East Pakistan market, nationalisation of 
the industrial sector, and oil shocks, the growth rate fell to just 3.9 percent in the 1970s. 
Growth rate of manufacturing output increased to 8.1 percent during the 1980s mainly 
due to an improvement in productivity of the public sector enterprises and overall 
improvement in productivity as a result of deregulation and import liberalisation. The 
growth rate slipped to just 3.5 percent in the 90s and in 1996-97, output of large scale 
manufacturing in fact declined.
3 A number of factors are responsible for the decline in 
the growth rate in the 90s. These include restructuring of the industrial sector following 
reduction in production, deflationary tendencies in the economy, inconsistent policies, 
lower level of investment and poor law and order situation. The reduction in sales taxes, 
provision of credit, rationalisation of tariffs and, above all, good sugarcane production 
lead the growth rate to 5.5 percent in 1997-98. 
Small-scale manufacturing sector in the 1950s and the 1960s grew at the rates of 
only 3.2 percent and 2.9 percent, not only because all the incentives were focused on the 
large-scale manufacturing but also became the small-scale sector was discriminated 
against, in the sense that they had to purchase raw materials at relatively higher cost. 
During the 1970s, the growth rate of the small-scale sector increased to 7.9 percent, 
which increased further to 8.4 percent in the subsequent periods. The increase in the 
growth rate of small-scale sector owes a great deal to exemptions from sales taxes and 
excise duties and better access to imported inputs. Unfortunately, recent data on the sub-
3The growth rate, however, increased to 8.5 percent in the first 10 months of 1997-98. A. R. Kemal  932 
sector is not available and it is assumed that small-scale industries continue to grow at a 
rate of 8.4 percent. There is some evidence to suggest that this growth rate may have 
been underestimating the true growth rate of the sub-sector [Kemal (1997)].  
Not only has the manufacturing sector exhibited high growth rate, there has also 
been diversification of industrial output, albeit at a slow pace. The removal of 
quantitative restrictions, lifting of import bans, and reduction in tariff rates on the import 
of raw materials and intermediate goods during the 1980s have diversified, the 
manufacturing output, even if only a little. The greater availability of imported raw 
materials and intermediate inputs at lower prices enabled more intensive use of capital in 
the import of intensive industries. This also raised the profitability and, as such, 
investment flowed into import-intensive industries. The share of traditional and 
indigenous raw material-based industries in the value-added in total manufacturing in 
1980-81, 1987-88, and 1990-91 shows a declining trend, though they still account for 
almost three-fifths of value-added. Their share amounted to 71.0, 671.5, 50.6, 64.5, 52.4, 
and 58.7 percent of the value-added in 1954, 1959-60, 1969-70, 1980-81, 1985-86, and 
1990-91, respectively (see Table 3).  
 
Growth of Industrial Investment 
Data on investment in the manufacturing sector during the 1950s is not 
available though it is generally presumed that, as a percentage of GDP, it was 
relatively small. It reached a maximum of 5.0 percent in 1964-65, but by 1969-70 it 
had already declined to 3.3 percent, and by 1974-75 further to 2.3 percent of GDP. 
(See Table 4.) Mainly because of public sector investment in various industries 
including fertiliser and engineering, investment increased to 4.3 percent in 1979-80. 
In the 1980s, public sector investment was deliberately kept low to accommodate 
private sector investment. However, total investment fell to 2.7 percent of GDP in 
1984-85 because private sector investment could not compensate for the decline in 
public investment. By 1989-90 it increased to 3.7 percent, but in subsequent years it 
declined and by 1996-97, it was just 2.7 percent of GDP.
4  
Decline in investment in the manufacturing sector in the post-1965 period may be 
attributed to three main factors. First, capital inflows fell sharply, and investment in 
Pakistan is constrained by the availability of investible funds. Second, the manufacturing 
sector suffered from lack of demand; the inefficient industrial sector developed behind 
the steep wall of protection was unable to compete in the export market and domestic 
demand was insufficient for adequate growth of traditional industries. Third, private 
sector was shy in investing in new industries, and in the existing industries room for 
expansion was rather limited. Even though nationalisation did scare away the private 
sector, the investment in the manufacturing sector had already started falling long before 
the advent of nationalisation policies. It may be further noted that despite private sector-
friendly policies, the investment in manufacturing as a percentage of GDP is still around 
2.7 percent of GDP.  















Investment in Manufacturing Industries during the Eighties 
 
Investment in Manufacturing 
as Percent of GDP 
Share of Private 
Investment in Total  
Year Private  Public  Total  Manufacturing 
1963-64   4.6  0.2  4.8  96.6 
1964-65 4.5  0.5  5.0  90.6 
1969-70 2.9  0.4  3.3  88.6 
1974-75 1.3  1.0  2.3  57.4 
1979-80 1.5  2.8  4.3  34.7 
1984-85 2.0  0.8  2.7  72.1 
1989-90 3.3  0.4  3.7  88.0 
1994-95 2.2  0.5  2.7  80.8 
1996-97 2.7  0.4  3.0  77.4 
1997-98 2.9  0.1  3.0   
Source: Census of Manufacturing Industries (Various Issues). 
 
The Sources of Growth in the Manufacturing Industries 
Import substitution has played a major role in the growth of manufacturing 
industries of Pakistan during its earlier stages of development. During the period 1951-
52 to 1954-55, 96.9 percent of growth was accounted for by import substitution and the 
contribution of export expansion, and the increase in domestic demand was negligible. 
However, since 1954-55, it has never been a major source of the manufacturing growth. 
Export expansion has been as important as import substitution but both were 
overshadowed by the increase in domestic demand. In the 1988-89 to 1991-92 period, 
however, export expansion was a major source of industrial growth. (See Table 5.) The 
recession in domestic demand and stagnant exports have constrained the manufacturing 
growth. (See Table 6.) 
That only one-quarter of the growth could be attributed to import substitution in 
the period upto 1970-71, and even less later, in the case of Pakistan may be contrasted 
with the results reported in Chenery and Taylor (1968), that import substitution typically 
accounted for about one-half of the growth of manufacturing output as per capita income 
grew from 100 dollars to 600 dollars. It also suggests that the recent decline in the 
manufacturing output may have been due to the slackness in demand.  A. R. Kemal  936 
Table 5 
Sources of Manufacturing Growth 
(Percentage) 
   Domestic    Export  Import 
Period   Demand  Expansion  Substitution 
1951-51 to 1954-55  2.4  1.8  96.6 
1954-55 to 1959-60  53.1  24.0  22.9 
1959-60 to 1963-64  95.7  4.6  -0.3 
1963-64 to 1970-71  60.0  15.0  25.0 
1980-81 to 1988-89  79.7  10.2  10.1 
1988-89 to 1991-92  60.4  37.9  1.7 
Source:  Khan (1964); Lewis (1970); Kemal (1990, 1993). 
 
Table 6 
The Average Implicit Effective Protection Rates and 
the Domestic Resource Cost 
   IEPRs DRCs 
1968-69 125  1.20 
1980-81 66  3.33 
1990-91 77  1.44 
   Source: Kemal (1978), Naqvi and Kemal (1991, 1998). 
 
 
III. CHANGES IN INDUSTRIAL INEFFICIENCY 
Because of the high rate of protection and distortions in the system, value-added 
in the manufacturing sector is grossly over-stated. The contribution of manufacturing 
sector at the world market prices is only fractional, reflecting gross inefficiencies and/or 
excessive profits. The average rate of effective protection
5 was as high as 271 percent in 
1963-64 [See Lewis and Guisinger (1968) and Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970)]. It fell 
to 125 percent in 1968-69 [See Kemal (1978)] and to 66 percent in 1980-81 [See Naqvi 
and Kemal (1991)], but increased once again to 77 percent in 1990-91 [See Naqvi and 
Kemal (1998)].
6 Domestic Resource Cost, which measures the level of inefficiency, fell 
from very high levels in 1963-64 to around 1.20 in 1968-69, but increased to 3.33 
percent by 1980-81. DRCs declined sharply, however, to 1.44 percent in 1990-91.  
5All the EPRs refer to Corden definition. 
6The high rates of protection in 1963-64 and 1968-69 indicate to some extent the over-valuation 





An analysis of changes in the level of efficiency in different time-periods is quite 
revealing. Efficiency improved significantly during the 1960s as a result of import 
liberalisation, deregulation and de-control policies. Total factor productivity grew at a 
rate of 5 percent per annum, i.e., 40 percent of growth was contributed by improvement 
in productivity. DRCs declined to 1.20 and it was also accompanied with somewhat 
decline in the effective protection rates. Efficiency levels fell once again in the 70s due 
to a number of factors enumerated earlier notably nationalisation and institution of 
regulations and controls in the economy once again. The liberal import policy and 
deregulation in the 1980s resulted in efficiency, though quantitative estimates of total 
factor productivity are not available. Nevertheless, the DRC declined to 1.44 percent but, 
paradoxically, the average effective protection rates also increased. This paradoxical 
result may be explained by noting that the increase in average EPRs may have been due 
to the fact that in 1990-91, except for three industries the industries did not suffer from 
negative protection. On the other hand, efficiency was mainly contributed by liberal 
import policy, especially relating to intermediate goods and raw materials and de-
regulation and de-control policies.  
  A detailed analysis of the relationship between efficiency and effective 
protection rates is quite revealing. Besides 9 negative value-added industries, there were 
40 inefficient industries in 1980-81 which were the most protected industries. On the 
other hand, fourteen inefficient industries were penalised, and probably they remained in 
business due to government subsidies. All in all, 13 industries were efficient, out of 
which 4 were protected and nine were negatively protected. The fact that out of 66 
inefficient industries 48 had a very high rate of effective protection, and out of 13 
efficient industries 9 were penalised, indicates the negative relationship between 
efficiency and protection. (See Table 7.) 
 
Table 7 
Degree of Protection and Level of Inefficiency 







IEPR 0<IEPR<50  IEPR<0  Total 
Negative Value-added  9  –  –  –  –  9 
Extremely Inefficient 
DRC > 2.0  –  34  3  –  4  41 
Highly Inefficient 
2.0 ≥ DRC > 1.50  –  1  –  5  4  10 
Very Inefficient 
1.50 ≥ DRC > 1.25  –  2  –  1  3  6 
Moderately Inefficient  –  0  –  2  1  3 
1.25 ≥ DRC > 1.00 
DRC ≤ 1.00  –  1  –  3  9  13 
Total 9  38  3  11  21  82 
Source:  Naqvi and Kemal (1998).                                                A. R. Kemal  938 
In 1990-91, besides 12 value-added industries, there were 3 inefficient industries 
and they were all protected. Out of 45 efficient industries, only three enjoyed negative 
protection. (See Table 8.) This shows, once again, the negative relationship between 
efficiency and protection. Another important result noted in Kemal (1993) is that the 
efficient industries have grown at a faster rate compared to the other industries. This also 
shows why efficiency improved over the 1980-81 to 1990-91 period despite rising rates 
of effective protection. While the levels of efficiency did improve, processing cost in 
1990-91 was still 44 percent higher than the world prices.  
 
Table 8 







50<IEPR 0<IEPR<50 IEPR<0 Total 
Negative Value-added  12  –  –  –  –  12 
Extremely Inefficient 
DRC > 2.0  –  6  –  –  –  6 
Highly Inefficient 
2.0 ≥ DRC > 1.50  –  3  –  –  –  3 
Quite Inefficient 
1.50 ≥ DRC > 1.25  –  2  –  –  –  2 
Moderately Inefficient  –  –  1  1  –  3 
1.25 ≥ DRC > 1.00 
DRC ≤ 1.00  –  28  1  13  3  45 
Total 11  34  3  14  3  70 
Source: Naqvi and Kemal (1998). 
 
The social costs of protection have been estimated alternately on the basis of two 
definitions. First, the cost of protection, defined as the wasteful use of domestic resource 
in the activity of earning (saving) foreign exchange, amounted to 9.9 percent of the GDP 
in 1980-81 and 3.9 percent of the GDP in 1990-91. Second, cost defined as the increase 
in the share of the manufacturing sector in the GDP due to protection, measured at world 
market prices, amounted to 5.7 percent of the GDP in 1980-81 and to 5.0 percent of the 
GDP in 1990-91. Both the measures indicate a sharp decline in the cost of protection to 
the economy.  
IV.  INDUSTRIALISATION STRATEGIES 
Whereas Pakistan has all along pursued import substitution industrial strategy, 
one finds that protection rates and the methods to provide protection have varied 
significantly over different time-periods. This has led to varied manufacturing industries 





The industrial policy of the 1950s aimed at processing the indigenous raw 
materials such as cotton, jute, hides and skins, etc., and at manufacturing those products 
for which she was heavily dependent on imports. Imports, investments, and prices were 
subject to direct controls during the 1950s which created rigidities
7 in the system and 
hampered the investment and levels of efficiency. Too much emphasis was placed on the 
reduction in imports, and too little on increasing the export earnings, which is manifested 
in the fact that the exchange rate was overvalued and there were no subsidies to the 
export to offset the tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imports.
8 
During the 1960s, price controls were lifted from almost all the products, foreign 
exchange market was liberalised, exports were subsidised, and fiscal incentives in the 
form of tax holidays and accelerated depreciation allowances were granted. These 
measures resulted in a rather high growth rate of 13.3 percent and a sharp increase in the 
level of efficiency. Total factor productivity increased at a rate of 5 percent but most of 
the increase was used to increase the rate of return rather than reduction in prices. The 
protection rates remained high and dispersion continued to be quite large. There was 
very little diversification and exports possibilities of traditional industries was limited. 
The emergence of structural problems
9 in the manufacturing sector by the end of 60s 
resulted in a reduction in the investments.  
A number of measures taken during the 1970s have a long-run bearing on the 
industrialisation process. Nationalisation of heavy industry, reserving exclusively 
cement, fertiliser, oil refining, engineering and chemicals industries for the public sector, 
price controls under the Profiteering and Hoarding Act, withdrawal of fiscal incentives 
and export subsidies, reduction in import duties on finished goods, and anti-monopoly 
measures eroded incentives for private sector investment. Low levels of profits amid 
uncertainty resulted in a massive flight of capital. Consequently, investment in 
manufacturing, and particularly private investment as a percentage of GDP, fell.
10 On the 
other hand, devaluation of the rupee reduced significantly the multiplicity of exchange 
rates and provided level playing fields to the large- and small-scale industries. Because 
small-scale industries had equal access to the imported inputs, the growth rate of small 
industries increased. Moreover, unification of the exchange rate made them competitive 
in the export market.  
7Because manufacturing industries in Pakistan were heavily dependent on imports for their 
requirements of capital and intermediate goods, rigid import quotas neither let the optimal allocation of 
investment nor let the industries to use their capital at an optimal level of intensity. Similarly, price controls 
left fewer incentives to expand production in the most profitable branches of production. 
8For details of the policies and impact on industries see Naqvi (1963); Khan (1964); Lewis and 
Soligo (1965); Lewis (1969); Lewis and Soligo (1965a) and Papanek (1967).  
9For detailed analysis see Islam (1967), Lewis (1969, 1970), Lewis and Guisinger (1968), Little, 
Scitovsky and Scott (1970); Papanek (1967); Soligo and Stern (1963); Naqvi (1965, 1971); Pal (1964, 1965); 
Thomas (1966); Kemal (1978).  
10For details of policy initiatives and growth in the 70s, see Azhar and Sharif (1974), Kemal and Alvi 
(1975), Naqvi and Sarmad (1984) and Naqvi and Kemal (1991).  A. R. Kemal  940 
During the 1980s and 1990s, direct controls have been replaced with market-
oriented forces; import policy has been liberalised; tariff structure has been rationalised; 
and maximum import duty has been reduced to 45 percent; export duties on raw cotton 
and cotton yarn have been removed; and certain other facilities are being provided to 
exporters. Fixed exchange rate system has been replaced with managed float, investment 
has been deregulated, prices have been de-controlled, and public enterprises have been 
divested. These measures did result in improvement in productivity. As DRC fell to 1.44 
does, but estimates of growth of productivity are not available.  
During the 1980s Pakistan also actively encouraged foreign private investment 
especially to affect transfer of technology. With a view to encouraging assembly-cum-
manufacturing, government provides incentives to assemblers through lower import 
duties on components provided they agree to a programme of indigenisation called the 
‘deletion programme’. While some transfer of technology except motor vehicles has 
taken place, there is a danger that the cost of transfer of technology may have been 




V.  STRATEGY AND FUTURE OPTIONS OF 
THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
The emergence of structural problems and consequently reduction in investments 
and growth of output necessitate a closer look at the industrial policy of Pakistan. While 
deregulation and import liberalisation have already led to improvements in the levels of 
efficiency and diversification of the industrial sector, the pace of improvement has been 
relatively slow. Even in 1990-91, processing cost, on average, was 44 percent higher 
than the world level. The future strategy has to bring the levels of DRCs down, even 
further and the manufacturing sector has to move into new areas where high growth 
rates can be sustained. 
Inconsistent and frequent changes in the policies besides inadequate 
infrastructures and the law and order situation have been responsible for the low levels 
of investment. Obviously, policy formulation to serve inconsistent objectives is not 
possible. In the past, regional development has always been given an over-riding 
consideration in the industrial policies. While the policies failed to realise the objective, 
they resulted in distortions in the system. Pakistan must pursue only efficient 
industrialisation as the country can no longer afford the luxury of sacrificing efficiency 
for regional industrialisation.   
Pakistan has to pursue the sole objective of accelerating the pace of industrial 
investment in activities which accord with her dynamic comparative advantage. To the 
extent that dynamic and static comparative advantages differ, the government will have 
11For details of policies and their impact on manufacturing industries during this policy, see IMG 





to influence the structure of incentives, largely governed in Pakistan by the protection 
structure, which is being rationalised. The rationalising may be carried out to reduce 
both magnitude as well as dispersion in the effective protection.  
Cascading the tariff structure by stages of processing implies that both the infant 
as well as the mature industries are provided the same incentives. Tariff structure has to 
be changed in such a way that the activities chosen accord with dynamic and not static 
comparative advantage. The recently announced investment policy provides more fiscal 
incentives to the infant industries, which are technology-based and have high value-
added industries. Such a policy would be difficult to operationalise, and one does not 
know if it would accord with long-run comparative advantage of Pakistan.  
While protection structure in accordance with dynamic comparative advantage is 
necessary for efficient industrialisation, it may not be sufficient. The government has to 
provide for the necessary physical and social infrastructure and regulatory framework. 
Augmenting the science and technology apparatus of private sector, bringing research 
institutions up to international standards, and streamlining of technology creation, 
absorption, and diffusion systems are essential if Pakistan wants to diversify her production 
towards new technology-based industries [See DRI/McGraw Hill (1997, 1997a)]. 
With a view to improving the standardisation and quality of products and to 
transferring technology, Pakistan has been encouraging foreign private investment. 
Technology transfer may be effected through indigenisation programmes. These 
programmes create incentives for the firms to develop vendors. In general, the assemblers 
have been arguing that there have been no vendors and as such government intervention 
may be necessary. Cluster approach, i.e., an agglomeration of key industries, supporting 
sectors, infrastructures, and institutions that are inter-linked and inter-dependent because of 
some shared technological or skill base, can be quite helpful in the development of vendors. 
The clusters funds provided by government can be used to carry out contract research 
which would enhance the technological landscape. As a result, entrepreneurs would use the 
imported technology in a better way; they would also be able to implement ancillary 
systems such as quality control, material handling, and the distribution system. 
The present industrial structure of Pakistan is based on low skills. Human 
resource development through cluster approach would improve industrial efficiency 
through innovations. Obviously, the firms operating in traditional industries have so far 
innovated very little but these clusters can help them in improving productivity. On the 
other hand, industries, such as electronic or auto parts, would benefit from these cluster 
in product design, automation, and inventory control.  
The regulatory framework needs to be streamlined. There is a need to improve 
outdated and overlapping labour laws with new comprehensive laws. Similarly, the 
Monopolies and Trade Restrictive Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 
needs to be modified; the winding-up procedure for insolvent companies needs to be A. R. Kemal  942 
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